Diesel for t 34 creation history. Military review and politics

To begin with, the engine, which was installed on the famous T-34, KV and IS, is being produced ... until now! Today he regularly serves in our army - under the hoods of tanks and rocket carriers. No wonder: the design of the 12-cylinder V-twin engine with direct fuel injection, four valves per cylinder, overhead camshafts remains quite modern.

The range of the diesel T-34 is 30 times higher than that of the German Pz IV, and in fact it is one and a half times more powerful

By the way, it was originally developed in two versions, tank and aviation - yes, don't be surprised, in the early 30s the diesel engine was considered very promising in aircraft construction! This is where the engine has forged light alloy pistons and die-cast aluminum heads - the use of "winged metal" allowed for a high power density.

True, for a heavy bomber just the power was not enough. And the R-5 reconnaissance aircraft, on which the engine was installed, lacked the reliability of a diesel engine. Nevertheless, in 1934, equipped with the "Fast diesel" BD-2, the BT-5 tank entered the test range, and in March of the next year the Kharkov steam locomotive plant, as well as its director Bondarenko and motor designers Konstantin Chelpan and Yakov Vikhman were awarded Order of Lenin. Alas, work on the future great tank diesel engine was just beginning at that moment.

The motor, which was assigned the serial number B-2, turned out to be extremely unreliable, even at the stand it worked for only 10-15 hours - seizures appeared in the cylinders, on the bearing shells, and shaft journals. Inexperienced designers incorrectly distributed the loads on the main bearings, increased vibration destroyed body parts and crankshafts, crankcases cracked, studs flew ... It took two years to fine-tune, but the next tests showed that it was not possible to achieve reliability - one of three B-2 at the stand worked for 72 hours, the second after 100 hours showed increased oil consumption, smoky exhaust and a crack in the cylinder head, the third had a burst crankcase. And again, nothing surprising: insufficient production culture and lack of high-precision equipment at the Kharkov steam locomotive named after the Comintern, design flaws inevitable for an inexperienced engineering team. After all, it was a new thing - nowhere in the world were they producing high-speed and high-power diesel engines at that time. But in the late 1930s, the guilty ones were found quickly: the order-bearers were arrested, Chelpan and Bondarenko were shot in 1938, Vikhman and his assistant Ivan Trashutin, who developed the 4-valve mechanism, miraculously survived.

Finally, on September 1, 1939, on the first day of World War II, serial production of the B-2 began. The advantages of a diesel engine seem obvious to us now: lower fire hazard, efficiency. In addition, the engine, which does not have an ignition system, created less interference with radio electronics, and could also run on any fuel, including gasoline and aviation kerosene. The range of the T-34 on the highway is 30 percent higher than that of the German Pz IV, and in fact it is one and a half times more powerful - as much as 500 forces - and faster.

There was only one problem - reliability. Rather, its complete absence. Even when Soviet engineers and the military in the mid-30s were arguing about the fate of new tank engines, the gasoline aircraft M-17 (which was a licensed copy of the BMW VI) provided a guaranteed resource of 250 hours. And in the technical passport of the T-34, the warranty period was indicated as 150 hours, but, as established by a special commission of the Main Armored Directorate in November 1942, it "does not correspond to reality." In fact, the motor worked three times less. Air filters practically did not retain sand and dust, the piston rings, because of this, wore out catastrophically, oil consumption reached 30 kg per hour. On tests in the United States in 1943, the T-34 traveled only 665 km: the engine worked for 58 hours under load, 14 hours without load, in total there were 14 breakdowns.

Yes, only our military leaders did not particularly care about the insufficient resource of diesel engines. The tanks and, accordingly, their crews were cannon fodder, which the hero-marshals, led by the cannibal Generalissimo, threw into the jaws of the world massacre. This was especially clearly shown by the Battle of Kursk, in which four of ours fell on each German tank destroyed. In total, 35 467 T-34s were produced during the war years, at least 20 thousand of them died ...

In 1943, the service life of the main components and assemblies of the power plant was barely enough for 300-400 km, and only by 1946 it was possible to bring the mileage to 1200-1500 km. The total number of breakdowns has decreased from 26 to 9 per 1000 km. The share of cars that passed warranty tests increased from 27 to 44%. But two years later, it dropped to 20% again - both technology violations and the general low level of the B-2 design affected. Incidentally, the T-54 designed immediately after the war turned out to be so unreliable that the three leading tank factories had to be stopped for a year. Only by the mid-50s, the B-2 was brought to mind, and today its deeply modernized version with a capacity of 1000 hp, equipped with a turbocharger, is installed on the T-92 tank. How reliable is it? The question is purely rhetorical - after all, the average lifetime of a tank in modern combat does not exceed 10 minutes ...

About the oil consumption of the V-2 diesel engine and its numerous descendants (V-6 / V-6A / V-6B, V-46, A-650G, A-401, V-54T / A-712) installed on equipment as military (BTR-50, PT-76, T-72, ZSU Shilka), as well as economic (GT-T, ATC-59G, Vityaz DT-30, etc.), and how to fence it is written in note.

When you stand near a T-34 tank, wherever and in whatever condition it is, shiny with paint or, like ours, shabby and cut with a cutter, you want to take off your cap. Looking inside, in my thoughts I see my grandfather Misha, the gunner-radio operator. I remember his story, how I crawled out of the car, engulfed in tongues of flame, near Vienna. This is the history of my people, the pride of my country. And the technical idea is still alive.

Technical thoughts led me with my GT-T to him, namely to his V-2-34 engine. More precisely, this is a SU-100 self-propelled gun, judging by the shape of the remains of the hull cut off during the conversion of a combat vehicle into a transport top.

Diesel engines of the B-2 type developed in the 30s are still characterized by high specific parameters, their specific weight is only 2.05 kg / hp, and specific fuel consumption is 165 g / hp * h. But the age of the design causes drawbacks, the main of which are: ineffective operation of oil scraper rings of an outdated design and, as a consequence, high oil consumption for waste - 20 g / hp * h; rapid wear of the valve guides and even greater oil consumption that enters the cylinders after lubricating the cylinder head camshafts.

The design of the GT-T transporter-tractor uses the power plant of the PT-76 amphibious tank based on single-row diesel engines of the V-6 family, derived from the two-row V-2.

Many parts and assemblies of this type of motors are unified. Including the head of the main (left) cylinder block assembly, blocks with liners (silumin and cast iron) and pistons. On my B-6A, the wear of the valve bushings for 33 years of moderate operation has developed so much that when the manifold is removed, the process of flight and combustion of oil is observed in the valves with the naked eye. I had to change the cylinder head assembly.

The emergence of new materials and technologies makes it relatively easy to eliminate the above disadvantages. Nevertheless, for many years of serial production of diesel engines V-2, D12, A-650 and M-401, their design has practically not changed. And in the engine compartments of modern Ural tanks, the original forms of the V-2 tank diesel are easily guessed.

In the late thirties, we created a unique tank engine that stepped into the 21st century. To understand what we are dealing with and to admire the design idea again, let's look into history.

At the beginning of the 30s of the twentieth century, special tank engines were not available not only for us. Thoughts that we were the first to put diesel on tanks are not entirely correct. The first to use a diesel engine on serial tanks in 1932 were the Poles, followed by the Japanese. These were low-power automotive diesel engines. The tanks were also relatively light. In the first half of the 30s. Soviet tanks were equipped with aviation gasoline engines that had exhausted their flight life. The operating conditions of a tank engine are sharp changes in the operating mode, load drops, difficult cooling conditions, air intake, etc. A tank engine must be more powerful than a car engine. Medium tanks needed an easy-to-operate, durable and reliable engine with a capacity of 300-400 hp, with good adaptability to significant overloads. As the German general G. Guderian wrote after the war, a tank engine should be considered the same weapon as a cannon.

In the early 30s, against the background of the lack of special tank engines in the world in general, in our country, they began to create a special tank diesel engine. It was a daring undertaking. The best design personnel were thrown into its implementation. Despite the lack of experience, the designers began work on creating a diesel engine capable of developing crankshaft revolutions up to 2000 rpm. They decided to design it as universal, i.e. suitable for installation on tanks, aircraft and tracked tractors. It was necessary to obtain the following indicators: power - 400-500 hp. at 1700/1800 rpm, specific gravity no more than 0.6 kgf / hp. In the 30s, they worked on diesel engines not only at the NAMI Automobile Institute, but also at the Central Institute of Aviation Motors. They were developed for installation on airplanes and airships. The AN-1 heavy fuel aircraft engine created by CIAM was distinguished by its high efficiency and served as the basis for a number of many high-speed engines that are still used today, the basis and not a prototype, including the future tank engine.

By May 1, 1933, the high-speed diesel engine BD-2 was assembled and tested. But tests revealed so many defects in it that there could be no question of putting it on a tank. For example, the engine head with two valves did not provide the target power due to the low cylinder fill ratio. The exhaust was so smoky and pungent that it interfered with the work of the crews of the experienced BT-5 tanks. The crankcase and crankshaft structures were not sufficiently rigid. And nevertheless, by the end of 1937, a new finished model of a four-valve diesel engine was installed on the test bench, which by that time had received the name V-2. In the summer of 1939, the first B-2 serial diesel engines installed on tanks, artillery tractors and on test benches were subjected to the most rigorous examination.

In 1939, large-scale production of the world's first 500-horsepower high-speed tank V-2 diesel engines began, which were put into production by the same order of the Defense Committee, which adopted the T-34 and KV. The engine was born together with the tank.It had no analogues in the world of tank building. possessed amazing universalism.

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, V-2 tank diesels were produced only by plant # 75 in Kharkov. The pre-war developments of the factory # 75 design bureau include the creation of a 6-cylinder tank diesel engine V-4 with a capacity of 300 hp. at 1800 rpm, designed for installation in a light tank T-50. Their production was to be organized at one plant near Moscow. The war prevented this. But factory # 75 managed to produce several dozen of these motors. Other pre-war developments - diesel engines V-5 and V-6 (supercharged), created in "metal". Experimental diesel engines were also manufactured: boosted in terms of speed up to 700 hp. V-2sf and 850-strong V-2sn supercharged. The outbreak of war forced to stop this work and focus on improving the main diesel engine V-2. With the beginning of the war, V-2 began to produce STZ, and a little later, plant No. 76 in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Kirovsky (ChKZ). The first diesel engines in Chelyabinsk began to be produced in December 1941. I. Ya. Trashutin (all engines of post-war Ural tanks) became the chief designer of ChKZ for diesel engines. But there weren't enough motors. And in 1942 a diesel plant No. 77 was urgently built in Barnaul (the first ten diesels were produced in November 1942). All in all, these factories in 1942 produced 17211, in 1943 - 22974 and in 1944 - 28136 diesel engines. T-34 tanks and self-propelled units based on it were equipped with a V-2-34 diesel engine (on BT tanks - a V-2 diesel engine, and on heavy KB there was its 640-strong version of the V-2K). It is a 4-stroke, 12-cylinder V-type high-speed naturally aspirated water-cooled diesel engine with jet fuel spray. The cylinders are angled 60 ″ to each other. Rated engine power 450 HP at 1750 rpm of the crankshaft. Operating power at 1700 rpm - 500 HP The number of revolutions of the crankshaft at idle speed is 600 rpm. Specific fuel consumption - 160-170 g / hp. The diameter of the cylinders is 150 mm, the displacement is 38.8 liters, the compression ratio is 14-15. The dry weight of the engine is 874 kg.

In the post-war years, the following modifications of the V-2 and V-6 engines were applied at the objects of armored vehicles: V-55, V-55V, V-54B, V-54, V-54G, V-54K-IS, V-54K-IST , V-105B, V-105V, V-34-M11, V-2-34KR, V-2-34T, V12-5B, V-12-6V, V-6B, V-6, V-6PG, V -6PV, V-6PVG, V-6M, V-6R, V-6R-1 and V-6M-1. The B-2 was also adapted for the most diverse needs of the national economy with the birth of a large number of modifications. The V-404C engine for the Antarctic snowmobile "Kharkovchanka" became a great success of the designer.

In the 1960s, the Trashutin Design Bureau created the B-46 turbo-piston diesel engines for the T-72 tanks and subsequent generations of combat vehicles. Further development was the latest modifications of the B-82 and B-92, which at the turn of the century reached the parameters initiated by the designers of the B-2 in the 30s - specific weight 1 - 0.7 kg / hp, power more than 1000 hp. at 2000 rpm. Equipped with gas turbine supercharging, improved fuel equipment and a cylinder-piston group, the V-92S2 diesel engine is at the level of the best world models, and surpasses most in terms of economy and specific mass-dimensional indicators. The mass of the В-92С2 engine is only 1020 kg, which is more than 2 times less than the weight of the AVDS-1790 (USA), C12V (England), UDV-12-1100 (France) engines. In terms of overall power, the V-92S2 surpasses them by 1.5 - 4.5 times, and in terms of fuel efficiency - by 5-25%. has a torque reserve of 25-30%. Such a reserve greatly facilitates machine control, increases maneuverability and average speed. The T-90 tank is one of the best serial images of armored military equipment in the world due to the highest combat effectiveness, acceptable cost and amazing reliability.

Let's go back to our life in the Polar Mountains. Being engaged in geological research, I again found myself at the facility where a self-propelled tractor SU-100 has been growing into the tundra for half a century. She, like three similarly reconstructed SAU-76 in other places, was abandoned in the early 60s of the last century in the open air by uranium geologists. To assess the state of the insides of the V-2-34 diesel, I habitually opened the injector hatch in the cover of the head of the left cylinder block. What I saw amazed me. Shiny mirrors on the camshafts, all covered with a thin layer of oil.

It's as if the engine had been stopped just recently, not 50 years ago. All fuel pumps (high-pressure fuel pumps and BNK), as well as the air start distributor, were apparently borrowed at one time by passing AT-S-chiks. The right intake manifold is loose. Starter and alternator removed. The rest was all in place and not very rusty.

After a little consumption with a sledgehammer, the control rods came to life, passing along the bottom of the hull from the driver's seat to the main and side clutches and brakes. The main one turned off by pressing the pedal, but the engine did not want to turn over by the flywheel, it was stuck. Those. in any case, it is not suitable for work without a bulkhead. Having estimated the amount of work, the necessary equipment and strength, I returned to my geological camp.

Taking advantage of the wet weather that was not working for the geologist, the next day with a group of student youth began to dismantle the cylinder head of the left collapse of the V-2-34. Absolutely all nuts were unscrewed without problems, even the nuts of the main anchor rods.

When lifting the cylinder head, the latter stuck with a gasket and did not want to separate from the block surface. As it turned out later, it was necessary to take away the head with a shirt and sleeves. But this became clear much later, when disassembling the GT-T diesel engine, which at that time was standing right there, next to the "tank". After the block of cylinders, dressed on anchor pins, remained in the place of the left camber, and the cylinder head assembly was taken to the side, another miracle appeared. All rubber seals, both anchor shafts and bypass tubes made of natural rubber, honey-colored, remained elastic.

My overgrown face was reflected in the cylinder liner mirrors. The fingers automatically ran along the upper edges of the mirrors - the wear on the sleeves was almost not felt. But there was no time to dismantle the pistons. At that time, I was not going to change the cylinder-piston group on my B-6A. Nevertheless, diesel fuel with used oil was poured into the cylinders, and the mirrors were additionally coated with grease. The entire left camber was wrapped in an oiled tarpaulin for the winter.

Some time later, due to the age of the car, the main clutch jammed at the base, so that one of the rods from the shutdown leash was thrown through the ejector into the street. In parallel with the replacement of the clutch, he began to prepare the replacement of the diesel cylinder head with the one brought from the "tank", relatively new in terms of wear and at the same time old in age. By the way, my head was no longer my own.

I changed it to the head of the main collapse of the A-650 diesel engine, left over from the AT-C (product 712) and kept in my reserve, complete with a block and pistons. Then I did not change the piston because of the decent output on the liners of this block. When I removed the cylinder head from my engine, I was distressed and puzzled by the very poor condition of the mirrors.

In addition to normal wear and tear and decent wear, there were ring scratches on the liners, similar to traces of sticking piston rings or cracks. It really could be. In history there was a case of movement without water in a system of 300 meters, after it was dumped through a torn pipe. Then I changed the cylinder head along with the gasket and rubber seals of the bypass pipes. Here I had to regret the piston left on the "tank"!

Winter passed for various other things and worries about the base. My tractor was disassembled. Already in the summer I asked a friend to drive a GAZ-34039 to get spare parts for a piston.

Let's go to GAZ to pick up the piston.

When we approached our lonely self-propelled vehicle, it turned out that someone curious, most likely a reindeer herder, had scattered my packaging at the beginning of summer. There was water in the cylinders. The cylinders weren't so perfect anymore. I regretted not taking everything at once. But, as it turned out, I still could not have done it without disassembling the right camber. We pulled off the left block of cylinders. But to remove the pistons from the connecting rods, you must gradually turn the crankshaft.

The cylinder blocks B-2-34 are removed. The motor spins freely

And he did not turn - he stood as if glued. The engine began to crank only after removing the nuts of the stitching and anchor rods of the right camber. The pistons went up along with the entire block and head. It became clear, and after removing the cylinder head, it was clear that the pistons in two cylinders with open valves were simply rusted. A little tinkering had to be done before the cylinder block was lifted off the pistons and set aside.

The engine without cylinders rotated easily and we proceeded to dismantle the pistons, which, as you know, should be replaced in pairs with liners. Field technology - the piston is carefully warmed up by a blowtorch and beaten into the end of the piston pin with a non-ferrous metal punch. After reaching a sufficient temperature, the pin freely extends until the piston is free from the connecting rod and remains in the seat until it cools.

Since the left-hand camber cylinders still suffered from premature de-preservation by an unknown intruder, it was decided to take all the pistons so that there was plenty to choose from for the inline B-6A kit. For 2 revolutions of the crankshaft behind the fan wheel, all pistons with fingers were packed into boxes. It remained to load into the GAZon and pack the extracted two cylinder blocks, removed fasteners and tubes. In the evening we set off on our way back. With the self-propelled tractor, my sense of duty remained ...

Preparing the piston and assembling the engine took place in late autumn. According to the plan, it was supposed to disassemble the native cylinder block V-6A GT-T and press the liners from V-2-34 into it.

But it turned out that the sleeves that had worked for 33 years in the silumin shirt of the block did not want to leave it either with a sledgehammer or with a puller. The stripper bar was bent. The sleeve was pushed 3 mm with a sledgehammer through a copper bar. Obviously, the entire jacket of the block had to be heated before extracting the sleeves.

But I remembered about the stored block from the A-650 made of aluminum alloy. Then I didn't want to make the car heavier with a cast-iron block from V-2-34, it is much heavier. But after the AT-S block shirt had been slopped and thoroughly washed, I saw cracks in it between the cylinder seats.

It is clear that such a head is only suitable for scrap or as a visual aid. There was nothing to do but to assemble a block in a cast-iron jacket. When washing and cleaning the disassembled cylinder blocks B-6A, A-650 and B-2-34, I was struck by the strict conformity of the casting, despite the difference in years of manufacture and materials (silumin and cast iron), as well as perfect elasticity and a fresh smell of rubber that emanated from the O-rings removed from the sleeves. They were brown rubber. Uncasing the V-2-34 block, as well as the block from the A-650, was easily performed with a screw puller.

The sleeves are in good condition, and the pistons from them were soaked in a barrel of diesel fuel and washed. Most of the piston rings are stuck in their grooves.

Rings of pistons removed from V-2-34 in comparison with rings of worn pistons of the GT-T diesel engine, after cleaning, move without play in the grooves. My old pistons were no longer usable due to broken grooves. In preparation for assembling the engine, the piston rings were fixed with cotton thread. The visual difference between the B-6A and B-2-34 pistons is only that the bottom of the B-6 piston is smooth bowl-shaped inside, and the bottom of the piston from the "tank" is made in the form of a lattice of heat sink fins. The pistons from V-2-34 were installed without unnecessary difficulties on the connecting rods of my V-6A in the same way as they were removed.

The assembly of the unit, like all preparation work, was carried out on a table in a warm and well-lit environment. O-ring rubber liners, together with seals and a gasket under the cylinder head, were purchased in advance from LLC "Neva-diesel", St. Petersburg. In the end, it turned out that the cylinder block B-2-34 was reassembled in a cast-iron jacket with 6 liners selected from 12. For control, the unit, ready for installation, was subjected to hydraulic tests. During the day, it was filled with diesel fuel on the plane of the cylinder head mirror installation.

The Soviet "thirty-four", recognized as one of the best combat vehicles of the Second World War, is rightfully considered the classics of world tank building. At the same time, the tank, which met the war in 1941, looked noticeably different by the time it was victorious. Having retained all of its main external features, he significantly increased in fighting qualities. According to the results of the work of Soviet developers, done by them during the most difficult war, in the modification of the T-34-85 tank they created, all the constructive solutions laid down earlier were, without exaggeration, brought to perfection.

The reasons for the modernization of the T-34

From the very first days of the attack on the USSR, German troops, faced with the latest Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, recognized them as an extremely dangerous enemy for themselves. Moreover, Germany, with all its industrial power and reliance on the resources of the Europe conquered by it, was unable to oppose anything comparable in response for a long time. The first attempt of this kind in the form of modernizing its most powerful Pz-IV tank in 1942 proved to be ineffective, despite the fact that these tanks began to weigh much more and their passability dropped sharply.

Nevertheless, due to the development of new models of tanks, primarily the Pz-V "Panther", the Third Reich was able to count on significant successes in the tank confrontation with the Soviet Army by the middle of 1943. With the advent of the "Panthers", the German tactics of using their tank forces with predominantly "anti-tank" missions (tank ambushes, local counterattacks), which had developed by that time, gained the opportunity for more active offensive actions.

Such an attempt on the German side was the grandiose Battle of Kursk, after the defeat in which Germany finally lost the chance to win the war. At the same time, the victory at Kursk came at a high cost to the Soviet side. New German tanks showed in this battle their ability to almost guaranteed to hit T-34 armor from a distance of 1.5 kilometers. At the same time, the 76-mm T-34 cannon, which had been so effective earlier, could penetrate the Panther's frontal armor from a distance of no more than 100 meters.

Of course, the newest German Pz-V and Pz-VI tanks were an order of magnitude more massive and clearly "older in class" than the T-34 tanks. But creating an opportunity for a successful confrontation with such an enemy at the distances of a real tank battle has become one of the most important tasks set by the top Soviet leadership for the designers of domestic tanks. This was a key condition in the course of the current radical change in the war in order to achieve its victorious end sooner and with fewer losses.

Main goals and objectives

After the death of the main creator of the thirty-four, Mikhail Koshkin, the design bureau, headed by Alexander Morozov, continued to work on improving the T-34 from the first years of the war. On the basis of this tank, in the summer of 1942, the development of a new model began, which was supposed to introduce a number of significant design changes. First of all, this concerned the replacement of the type of suspension with a torsion bar and the strengthening of armor protection. The new version of the Soviet medium tank was originally planned to be called the T-43.

Despite the very attractive prospects of the new machine, the final revision of its design without losses for performance characteristics required time, which, as it became obvious from the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, seriously multiplied the losses of Soviet tanks in the confrontation with the German "tigers" and "panthers". In addition, the launch of the T-43 into the series would inevitably lead to a failure of the barely established mass production of the T-34, and such a decision was assessed as unacceptable.

More rational for the leadership of the USSR was a deep modernization of the T-34, during which it was supposed to introduce the innovations intended for the T-43 as organically as possible into its design. Ultimately, this approach was embodied in the tank, dubbed the T-34-85, which became the glorified and victorious version of the most massive tank of the Second World War.

A tough and decisive choice in favor of the updated T-34 instead of the T-43 was made at the personal request of I.V. Stalin. According to the memoirs of the chief designer of the tank A.A. Morozov, the Soviet leader gave the following comparison in this regard: "During a fire, pumps are not designed, but water is carried in everything that can be used for this."

Design

The modernization of the T-34 tank on the basis of personal Stalinist instructions was limited to strengthening artillery weapons and improving visibility, that is, eliminating the main shortcomings of the original version. The general layout of the medium tank has not undergone any significant changes. The main priority for the developers was simplicity and manufacturability, which helps to reduce labor costs for tank building production.

The main innovation of the T-34-85 design was the three-man turret, which was quickly improved on the basis of the existing reserve for the promising T-43 tank. Changes were made to the hull design for this turret: the turret ring diameter was increased from 1420 to 1600 mm. The tower itself was equipped with an effective commander's cupola, which significantly improved visibility, as well as more convenient hatches for evacuating the crew. At the same time, the weight of the tank increased only slightly.

In general, the design of the T-34-85 fit so effectively into the well-established mass production that the transition to their production from the T-34-76 model had almost no effect on production volumes. Moreover, the quality of components and assemblies of Soviet medium tanks has significantly improved since 1944, thereby increasing their reliability in combat conditions.

Specifications

The T-34-85 was distinguished by its highest maneuverability and cross-country characteristics, which were very effective for a medium tank of that time. He could overcome ups and downs with slopes up to 40 degrees, water obstacles up to 1.3 meters deep and ditches up to 2.5 meters deep.

By that time, the tank's equipment included all devices that were sufficiently modern for this period, including a ventilation system for powder gases, a radio station, and an internal intercom.

Dimensions and weight

Armament

Initially, the T-34-85 tank was supposed to be equipped with an 85-mm D-5 cannon, which had already been successfully used on the relatively small-scale KV-85, IS-85 (aka IS-1) and SU-85 tanks. But pretty soon in the Central Artillery Design Bureau a simpler and cheaper design of the ZIS-S-53 tank gun was born, which was based on a fairly effective anti-aircraft gun of the same caliber 85 mm, developed back in 1939. The total cost of such an artillery system was much lower than even that of the 76-mm F-34 cannon.

The tank's ammunition ranged from 56 to 60 rounds, depending on their types. The auxiliary armament of the T-34 included two 7.62 mm DT-29 machine guns. One of them operated in a twin with a cannon, the second was located in a ball mount in the upper frontal plate of the hull

Armor

The preservation of the basic structure of the hull of the T-34-85 did not allow to improve its booking, the parameters of which remained at the level of the previous tank model.

Strengthening the armor protection of the T-34-85 was provided due to the new design of the tower. Its frontal booking has doubled, from 45 to 90 mm. The sides of the turret were 75 mm thick and were also tilted at an angle of 20 degrees.

Engine and transmission

The power unit of the T-34-85 tank was a 38.88-liter model V-2 diesel engine, assembled mainly from lightweight materials based on aluminum, which was more typical for aviation. The unit was capable of developing a rated power of 450 horsepower. In mass production tanks, this figure was far from being fully achieved, but the performance of the engine with a margin was enough not only to set the equipment in motion, but also for rapid breakthroughs and maneuvering. The economical power plant gave the tank a cruising range of 400 kilometers on average.

The transmission of the tank, as is typical of tracked vehicles, was based on clutches. The T-34-85 manual transmission had five steps. It transmitted torque through gearboxes to the side clutches. The leading sprockets of the tracks were located on the rear wheels.

Chassis

The undercarriage of the T-34 tank was based on large double road wheels, of which there were five on each side. The drive wheels were located at the back, and the idler wheels (called sloths) were at the front. The rollers on each side were equipped with an individual spring suspension, the elements of which on the front rollers were protected by steel covers.

For the previous version of the tank, by the summer of 1942, a new cast corrugated tracked track 50 cm wide was developed. It turned out to be lighter and stronger than the previous smooth 55-cm track and served as the basis for the tracks of the Soviet thirty-fours until the end of the war.

Travel speed

The maximum speed developed by the tank was 55 km / h. The average speed of movement on rough terrain was 25 km / h.

Crew

The crew of a standard T-34-85 tank consisted of five people:

  • tank commander;
  • driver mechanic;
  • radio operator;
  • gunner;
  • charging.

The front of the fighting compartment housed a driver-mechanic (left) and a radio operator who controlled a course machine gun. The other three crew members acted in the turret of the tank. Unlike the T-34-76 version, the more spacious turret allowed the tank commander to concentrate on observing the external situation and directing the crew's actions, which in general significantly increased the tank's combat effectiveness.

The total number of tanks produced

The updated T-34 appeared in December 1943, and was put into mass production in the shortest possible time. The first serial tanks began to produce the Sormovsky plant in Gorky (during the Soviet era, Nizhny Novgorod was called that way), two months later, the T-34-85 began to produce the main plant for its assembly in Nizhny Tagil, and in June from the T-34-76 model to the new the plant in Omsk was transferred.

In general, by the end of the war, about 23 thousand updated T-34 tanks were produced. Depending on the calculation methodology and the release dates covered, the data in different sources differ, but not very significantly. Wikipedia estimates the number of T-34-85 tanks produced during the war years at 22.9 thousand, and their production in the post-war period was about 3.7 thousand. In addition, under a Soviet license in the 1950s, 3,185 tanks of this type were manufactured in Czechoslovakia and 1980 in Poland.

It is not known exactly how many T-34 tanks were sent to other countries after they were decommissioned in the USSR, most often in the form of gratuitous "military aid".

Advantages and disadvantages

The advantages of the T-34-85 include all those qualities that together cover the full list of the advantages of a medium tank. Among them:

  • the highest maneuverability;
  • large power reserve;
  • economical engine;
  • decent armor protection;
  • powerful cannon.

Fully reflecting these qualities, the updated T-34 tank showed significantly higher reliability compared to the initial model. Given its ease of manufacture and excellent maintainability, it can be considered one of the most advanced medium tank designs in the world.

Certain shortcomings, largely due to the tension of the war period, in general, did not particularly affect the high overall level of the T-34-85's combat capabilities. Among them, experts note a weak suspension and insufficiently improved visibility, as well as the absence of a rotating support for the loader, which made it difficult for his actions in battle.

Combat use

The first T-34-85 tanks appeared at the front in the spring of 1944, which fell on the final period of the Great Patriotic War, in which the USSR had a noticeable superiority over Germany and its allies. Soviet tanks became the main striking force in all major offensive operations of 1944-1945.

Possessing 85mm cannons, the T-34s had a complete advantage in confronting opponents of equal class and could offer decent resistance to any newest German armored vehicles, especially with the effective support of self-propelled guns and their own heavy tanks.

In the final stages of World War II, the mobility of Soviet T-34s began to be fully utilized. In the course of deep breakthroughs in the enemy's defenses, it was these tanks that crushed his rear and communications. Due to a sufficient power reserve and high mobility, they could, evading enemy counterstrikes, forestall the enemy's occupation of reserve lines of defense.

T-34-85 tanks were successfully used in battles against a powerful Japanese group that occupied northeast China and Korea. The most impressive example of the actions of tankers was the 5-day raid of the 6th Guards Tank Army, which advanced 450 kilometers, overcoming the Great Khingan ridge on the move, and went deep into the rear of the Kwantung Army.

After World War II, the T-34-85 tank was noted in several major local conflicts, including the wars of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against France (1946-1954) and the United States (1965-1974), the Korean War of 1950-1953 , the 1967 Arab-Israeli "Six Day War". In these battles, the Soviet-made tank very successfully opposed the best Western medium tanks of the time: the American Shermans, the French AMX-13 and the British Centurions.

Tanks T-34-85 were repeatedly used in the armed conflicts of the 1990s in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, with almost all the belligerent parties. In addition, the decommissioned "thirty-four" were supplied by the Soviet Union to more than 40 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, many of which became the scene of fierce internal conflicts. The facts of the participation of T-34-85 tanks in them are recorded up to the present time: the last such case was noted in 2020 in the Yemeni conflict.

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Transmission and engine of the T-34 tank

Almost all T-34 tanks and its modifications were equipped with 4-stroke, 12-cylinder, V-shaped diesel engines V-2-34, which had a liquid cooling system. This engine was designed and created under the guidance of the designer Konstantin Fedorovich Chelpan. The power of the diesel engine at 1800 rpm reached 500 hp, and at 1750 rpm the power reached 450 hp, at 1700 rpm the engine power (it was also called operational) reached 400 hp. In 1941 and 1942, there was a shortage of B-2 engines, so in those years 1201 T-34 tanks received M-17F and M-17T aviation carburetor engines, which were similar in power.

It looks like a diesel engine V-2-34, which was installed on T-34 tanks.

Tanks T-34, produced in 1940 and 1941, were equipped with systems for cleaning incoming air into the Pomon engine. This air cleaner differed from its analogues in reliability and quality. In 1942, this air cleaner was replaced by another one, of the Cyclone type, which in turn significantly improved the quality and reliability of the motor. The engine cooling system of the engine included two tubular radiators that were attached to the sides of the radiator. The fuel tanks of the T-34 tank were located inside the hull along the sides, as well as in the gaps between the spring housings of the chassis. According to many tank experts, such an arrangement of the tanks was dangerous, since when the tank was hit in the side, the fuel would ignite and the tank would fail. Even earlier versions of T-34 tanks were equipped with 6 tanks, which together formed a volume of 460 liters. T-34 tanks of late production were equipped with 8 tanks, which together formed a volume of up to 540 liters. This is all about the internal tanks. Also, external tanks were installed on the sides of the tank, the total capacity of which reached 134 liters in early versions; on tanks of 1942, external tanks (or containers) were installed at the stern and also had a volume of 134 liters. Later releases of T-34 tanks had 2, and then 3 cylindrical side tanks, which were each with a capacity of 90 liters.


4-speed manual gearbox mounted on the T-34 tank

As for the transmission of the T-34 tank (model 1940), it consisted of the following elements: single-stage final drives; mechanical three-way 4-speed (4 forward + 1 reverse) gearbox; side band brakes with Ferodo lining; the mechanism for turning the tank, which consisted of side multiple discs with dry friction clutches (friction was carried out by steel on steel); the main dry friction clutch (multi-disc) friction was carried out by steel on steel.

Starting in December 1942, new 5-speed manual transmissions with constant gearing of the gear mechanism began to be installed on all T-34 tanks. The design of the main clutch has also been modernized and improved.


Transmission of the T-34 tank

In the fall of 1941 in the city of Klin, a series of T-34-57 tanks were produced, which were armed with a 57-mm cannon. Also, the T-34-57 tank had a different propulsion system (a BMW-VI carburetor engine, which was manufactured under license). There is no information on the technical and maneuverability of the T-34-57 tanks in comparison with diesel engines.

T-34 at war

T-34 ("thirty-four") - Soviet medium tank of the period of the Great Patriotic War, was produced in series since 1940, and since 1944 it became the main medium tank of the Red Army of the USSR. Developed in Kharkov. The most massive medium tank of the Second World War. From 1942 to 1945 the main, large-scale production of the T-34 was deployed at powerful machine-building plants in the Urals and Siberia, and continued in the post-war years. The leading plant for the modification of the T-34 was the Ural Tank Plant No. 183. The latest modification (T-34-85) is in service with some countries to this day.

Due to its combat qualities, the T-34 was recognized by a number of specialists as the best medium tank of the Second World War and had a tremendous impact on the further development of world tank building. When creating it, Soviet designers managed to find the optimal balance between the main combat, operational and technological characteristics.

The T-34 tank is the most famous Soviet tank of the Second World War, as well as one of its most recognizable symbols. A large number of these tanks of various modifications have survived to this day in the form of monuments and museum exhibits.

History of creation

A-20 creation program. Since 1931, a series of light wheeled-tracked tanks "BT" was developed in the USSR, the prototype of which was the car of the American designer Walter Christie. In the course of serial production, vehicles of this type were constantly modernized in the direction of increasing firepower, manufacturability, reliability and other parameters. By 1937, the BT-7M tank with a conical turret was created in the USSR and began mass production; further development of the BT line was envisaged in several directions:

  • Increasing the power reserve by using a diesel engine (this direction led to the creation of the BT-7M tank).
  • Improvement of wheel travel (the work of N.F. Tsyganov's group on experimental BT-IS tanks).
  • Strengthening the tank's protection by installing armor at significant angles of inclination with a slight increase in its thickness. The group of N.F. Tsyganov (experimental BT-SV tank) and the design bureau of the Kharkov plant worked in this direction.

From 1931 to 1936, the talented designer Afansy Osipovich Firsov headed the design bureau of the Tank Department of the Kharkov Steam Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). All BT tanks were created under his leadership, and he made a significant contribution to the development of the V-2 diesel engine. At the end of 1935, elaborated sketches of a fundamentally new tank appeared: anti-cannon armor with large tilt angles, a long-barreled 76.2 mm cannon, a V-2 diesel engine, weighing up to 30 tons ... But in the summer of 1936, at the height of the repression, A.O. Firsov removed from the leadership of the KB. But he continues to work actively. A new gearbox for the BT tank was launched into production, developed by A.A. Morozov under the leadership of A.O. Firsov, designs the installation of a flamethrower and smoke devices on the tank, personally meets and introduces the new head of the design bureau, M.I.Koshkin. In mid-1937, A.O. Firsov was arrested again and sent to prison, where he died. The first project, created under his leadership by Firsov who replaced Firsov as chief designer Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin, the BT-9 tank, was rejected in the fall of 1937 due to gross design errors and non-compliance with the requirements of the assignment.

Oddly enough, but Koshkin was not imprisoned and shot in the same "terrible 37th" for "sabotage" and disruption of the state order. Also, Koshkin at the same time "thwarted" work on the development of a modification of the BT-BT-IS tank, which was carried out at the same plant by the group of the adjunct VAMM them. Stalin, military engineer 3rd rank A.Ya. Dick, assigned to the Koshkin Design Bureau at the KhPZ. Apparently Koshkin found competent "patrons" in the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building? Or did he initially act on orders from above? It seems that there was a covert struggle between supporters of the eternal "modernization" of the light BT (and in fact, marking time and a waste of "people's" public funds) and supporters of a fundamentally new (breakthrough) middle-class tank, which differed from monsters with three towers, such as T -28.

On October 13, 1937, the Armored Directorate of the Red Army (ABTU) issued factory number 183 (KhPZ) tactical and technical requirements for a new tank under the symbol BT-20 (A-20).

Due to the weakness of the design bureau of plant number 183, a separate design bureau was created at the enterprise for work on the new tank, independent of the Koshkin design bureau. The design bureau included a number of engineers from the design bureau of plant No. 183 (including A. A. Morozov), as well as about forty graduates of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (VAMM). The leadership of the design bureau was entrusted to the WAMM adjunct, Adolf Dick. Development is going on in difficult conditions: arrests continue at the plant.

In this chaos, Koshkin continues to develop his direction - the drawings, on which the backbone of the firsov design bureau (KB-24) is working, should form the basis of the future tank.

In September 1938, following a review of the BT-20 mockup, it was decided to manufacture three tanks (one wheeled-tracked and two tracked) and one armored hull for shelling tests. By the beginning of 1939, KB-24 completed working drawings for the A-20 and began designing the A-20G [sn 2]. "G" - tracked, later designated A-32.

At the end of September 1939, after showing the A-20 and A-32 (test driver N.F. Nosik) at the Kubinka training ground, the leadership of the NGO and members of the government decided to increase the thickness of the A-32 armor to 45 mm, after which they began sea \u200b\u200btrials of the A-32 tank, loaded with ballast (at the same time, a tower from the A-20 with a 45-mm gun was installed on the tank). On December 19, at a meeting of the Defense Committee, based on the results of tests of the A-32, Resolution No. 443 was adopted, which prescribed: Tank T-32 - tracked, with a diesel engine V-2, manufactured by plant No. 183 of the People's Commissariat for Medium Machinery Industry, with the following changes:

Pre-war tanks manufactured by factory # 183. From left to right: BT-7, A-20, T-34-76 with the L-11 cannon, T-34-76 with the F-34 cannon.

  • a) increase the thickness of the main armor plates to 45 mm;
  • b) improve visibility from the tank;
  • c) install the following weapons on the T-32 tank:
  • 1) an F-32 76 mm cannon, paired with a 7.62 mm machine gun;
  • 2) a separate machine gun for the radio operator - 7.62 mm;
  • 3) a separate machine gun of 7.62 mm caliber;
  • 4) 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine gun.
  • Name the specified tank T-34.

Pre-production tanks A-34 No. 1 and A-34 No. 2 On the night of March 5-6, 1940, tank No. 1 (test driver N. F. Nosik) and tank No. 2 (test driver I. G. Bitensky or V. Dyukanov) without weapons, camouflaged beyond recognition, as well as two heavy tracked artillery tractors "Voroshilovets" in the strictest secrecy went on their own to Moscow. Due to the breakdown of tank number 2 near Belgorod (breakage of the main clutch), the convoy split. Tank No. 1 arrived on March 12 at the machine-building plant No. 37 near Moscow, the city of Serpukhov, where it and the tank No. 2 that arrived later were repaired. On the night of March 17, both tanks arrived at the Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin to demonstrate to the leaders of the party and government.

On March 31, 1940, a protocol of the State Defense Committee was signed on the serial production of the A-34 (T-34) tank at plant number 183. The general production plan for 1940 was set at 200 vehicles, from 1942 STZ and KhPZ were to completely switch to the production of T -34 with a plan of 2000 tanks per year.

GABTU D.G. Pavlova presented a report on comparative tests to Marshal G.I. Kulik. That report approved and suspended the production and acceptance of the T-34, until “all shortcomings” were eliminated (what honest and principled generals we had then!). K.E. intervened. Voroshilov: “We will continue to make machines, submit them to the army. Limit the factory mileage to 1000 km ... "(the same" blunt horseman "). At the same time, everyone knew that the war would not be today or tomorrow. Months were carved out. Pavlov was a member of the country's military council, but he was, well, a very “principled officer”. Maybe for this “courage and adherence to principles” Stalin agreed with the appointment of the hero of the Soviet Union DG Pavlov to the “main” district-ZapOVO? But how Pavlov boldly and fundamentally commanded this district, surrendering Minsk on the fifth day, has already become a fact of history. At the same time, Pavlov himself was a professional tanker, fought in tanks in Spain, and received a hero of the Soviet Union for this war. His proposal to create a tracked tank with projectile armor with the installation of a 76 mm cannon on this tank (the caliber of the guns of heavy tanks of those years!) Was even recorded in the minutes of the KO meeting at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in March 1938, two years earlier. That is, Pavlov had to understand better than others what kind of tank was in front of him. And it was this man who did everything in his power to disrupt the acceptance of this tank into service.

The order to put the T-34 into mass production was signed by the Defense Committee on March 31, 1940, and the adopted protocol instructed to immediately put it into production at factories No. 183 and STZ. Plant No. 183 was ordered to produce the first experimental batch of 10 tanks by the first days of July. After the completion of the tests of two prototypes, a production plan was adopted, which provided for the production of 150 machines in 1940, which by June 7 was increased to 600 machines, 500 of which were to be supplied by plant number 183, while the remaining 100 - STZ. Due to delays in the supply of components, only four vehicles were assembled at factory # 183 in June, and the production of tanks at STZ was even more delayed. Although the pace of production was raised by the fall, they were still significantly behind the plan and were delayed by the lack of components, so in October, due to the lack of L-11 guns, only one tank was accepted by the military commission. The production of T-34s at STZ was even more delayed. Throughout 1940, work was underway to adapt the initially complex and low-tech tank to serial production, but despite this, during 1940, according to various sources, only from 97 to 117 vehicles were produced. During the fall of 1940, a number of larger changes were made to the T-34 design, such as the installation of a more powerful F-34 cannon, and cast and stamped towers were also developed at the Mariupol plant.

But in fact, M.I. Koshkin is not the father of the T-34. Rather, he is his "stepfather" or "cousin" father. Koshkin began his career as a tank designer at the Kirov plant, in the design bureau of medium and heavy tanks. In this design bureau, he worked on "medium" tanks T-28, T-29 with bulletproof armor. The T-29 already differed from the T-28 in the type of chassis, rollers and experimental torsion bar suspension, instead of spring. Then this type of suspension (torsion bars) was used on heavy tanks "KV", "IS". Then Koshkin was transferred to Kharkov, to the design bureau of light tanks, and apparently with the prospect of starting work on the design of precisely "medium", but on the basis of a light "BT". He had to, fulfilling the order of the army, making a light wheeled-tracked tank BT-20 (A-20), to achieve at least on its base to make a tracked version of this machine-A-20G, and bring it to the same T-34 ... Born from the blueprints of a light tank, the T-34 had problems with tightness in the tank and other shortcomings. Also from the light "BT" Koshkin got the chassis (on some T-34s they even put rollers from the "BT" tank, although they were already necessary calculated) and a spring suspension. Almost in parallel with the "creation and modernization" of the T-34, Koshkin also designed another medium tank, the T-34M, which had other chassis rollers, similar to those of the heavy "KV" wheels, with a torsion bar rather than a spring suspension (an example of the "universalization" of tank production , which was then used by the Germans in the production of their tanks during the War), a more spacious six-sided turret with a commander's cupola (it was later installed on the T-34 in 1942). This tank was even approved by the Defense Committee in January 1941. In May 1941, fifty of these towers were already manufactured at the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant, the first armored hulls, rollers, and a torsion bar suspension were manufactured (the "suspension from BT" remained on the T-34). But the engine for him was never made. And the outbreak of the war put an end to this model. Although the Koshkinskoye Design Bureau was engaged in intensive development of a new, "native" T-34M tank, more "better", but the outbreak of the War demanded a build-up of machines already put on the conveyor, those that are. And then, throughout the war, there was a constant alteration and improvement of the T-34. Its modernization was carried out at every plant where T-34s were assembled, constantly striving to reduce the cost of the tank. But still, the emphasis was placed primarily on increasing the number of tanks produced and throwing them into battle, especially in the fall and winter of 1941. "Comfort" was taken up later.

What happened

The start of serial production of the T-34 was the final stage of the three-year work of Soviet tank builders to create a fundamentally new combat vehicle. In 1941, the T-34 was superior to any tank in service with the German army. In response to the appearance of the T-34, the Germans developed the Panther, but also used captured T-34s wherever they could. Among several modifications of the T-34 was a flamethrower tank with a flamethrower installed in the hull instead of a frontal machine gun. In 1940-1945, the volume of production of "thirty-fours" was constantly increased, while labor costs and cost were reduced. So, during the war, the labor intensity of manufacturing one tank decreased 2.4 times (including an armored hull - 5 times, a diesel engine - 2.5 times), and the cost almost halved (from 270,000 rubles in 1941 to 142,000 rubles in 1945). T-34s were produced in thousands - the number of T-34s of all modifications, built in 1940-1945, exceeds 40,000.

Thirty-four "undoubtedly surpassed all enemy tanks at the beginning of the war in armament, protection and maneuverability. But it also had drawbacks." Childhood illnesses "affected the rapid failure of the onboard clutches. Visibility from the tank and the comfort of the crew left much to be desired .Only part of the vehicles were equipped with a radio station. The fenders and rectangular holes in the rear of the turret (on the machines of the first releases) were vulnerable. The presence of a frontal machine gun and a driver's hatch weakened the durability of the frontal armor plate. And although the shape of the T-34 hull was an object of imitation for designers for many years, already the heir of the "thirty-four" - the T-44 tank, these shortcomings were eliminated.

Combat use

The first T-34s began to enter the troops in the late autumn of 1940. By June 22, 1941, 1,066 T-34 tanks had been produced, in the border military districts there were 967 T-34s in the mechanized corps (mk) (including 50 in the Baltic Military District, 266 in the Western Special Military District). and in the Kiev Special Military District - 494 pcs.). The proportion of new types of tanks (T-34, KV and T-40 (tank)) in the troops was small, the basis of the Red Army's tank fleet before the war was lightly armored T-26 and BT. From the very first days of the war, T-34s took an active part in the hostilities. In a number of cases, T-34s were successful, but in general, their use, like tanks of other types, during the border battle turned out to be unsuccessful - most of the tanks were quickly lost, while the German offensive was not stopped. The fate of the 15mk vehicles, which had 72 T-34 and 64 KV on June 22, 1941, is quite characteristic. For a month of fighting, almost all the tanks of the mechanized corps were lost. The reasons for the low efficiency and high losses of the T-34 during this period are called the poor development of new tanks by personnel, tactically illiterate use of tanks, a shortage of armor-piercing shells, design flaws of poorly worked out in mass production vehicles, a lack of repair and evacuation means and the rapid movement of the front line , which forced to throw out of order, but maintainable tanks.

In the battles of the summer of 1941, the insufficient effectiveness against the T-34s of the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank guns, which were the most massive at that time in the German army, as well as German tank guns of all calibers, quickly became clear. However, the Wehrmacht possessed the means to successfully fight the T-34. In particular, 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns, 47-mm Pak 181 (f) and Pak 36 (t) anti-tank guns, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, 100-mm corps guns and 105- mm howitzers.

There are two reasons why the T-34s did not become the weapon that decided the outcome of the battles in the summer of 1941.The first is the incorrect tactics of tank combat among the Russians, the practice of spraying T-34s, using them together with lighter vehicles or as support for infantry, instead in order, like the Germans, to strike with powerful armored fists, break through the enemy's front and wreak havoc in his rear. The Russians did not grasp the fundamental rule of armored warfare, formulated by Guderian in one phrase: "Do not dissipate - gather all forces together." The second mistake was in the technique of fighting the Soviet tankers. The T-34 had one very vulnerable spot. The crew of four - the driver, gunner, loader and radio operator - lacked a fifth member, the commander. In the T-34, the commander served as a gunner. The combination of two tasks - maintenance of the gun and control over what is happening on the battlefield - did not contribute to the conduct of quick and effective fire. While the T-34 fired one round, the German T-IV consumed three. Thus, in battle, this served the Germans as compensation for the range of the T-34 cannons, and, despite the strong sloping 45-mm armor, Panzerwaffe's tankers hit Russian vehicles in the tracks of the tracks and other "weak points". In addition, each Soviet tank unit had only one radio transmitter - in the tank of the company commander.

As a result, Russian tank units were less mobile than German ones. Nonetheless, the T-34 remained a formidable and respectable weapon throughout the war. It is even difficult to imagine what consequences the massive use of the T-34 in the first weeks of the war could entail. What impression was made by the tactics of the use of their tank units by the Germans on the Soviet infantry. Unfortunately, at that time, the Soviet army did not have sufficient experience in conducting battles with large tank formations and a sufficient number of T-34s.

The situation changed dramatically at the end of 1941 and early 1942. The number of T-34s increased, and the design was constantly improved. The tactics of using tanks have changed. Artillery and aviation began to be used together with tank formations.

After the abolition of the defeated mechanized corps, by the end of the summer of 1941, the brigade became the largest tank organizational unit. Until the fall of 1941, the T-34s sent to the front from factories made up a relatively small percentage of Soviet tanks and did not cause the Germans particularly serious problems. However, since the number of tanks of old types was rapidly decreasing, the share of T-34s in the composition of the Soviet tank forces gradually grew - so, by October 16, 1941 in the Moscow direction, almost 42% of the available 582 tanks (244 tanks) were T-34s. The sudden appearance of new vehicles at the front had a great effect on German tankers:

"... until at the beginning of October 1941 the eastern Orel in front of the German 4th tank division did not appear Russian T-34 tanks and showed our tankers accustomed to victories their superiority in weapons, armor and maneuverability. The T-34 tank made a sensation. This 26 -tone Russian tank was armed with a 76.2-mm cannon (caliber 41.5), the shells of which pierced the armor of German tanks from 1.5 - 2 thousand meters, while German tanks could hit Russians from a distance of no more than 500 m, and even then only if the shells hit the side and rear of the T-34 tank. "

Since the fall of 1941, the T-34s began to pose a serious problem for the German troops, the actions of the 4th tank brigade of M.E. Katukov against units of the 4th tank division of the Wehrmacht near Mtsensk in October 1941 are especially indicative in this regard. If back in early October 1941 G. Guderian in a letter to the leadership of the tank forces stated:

"... the Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and have repeatedly proved their superiority ..."

then by the end of the same month, under the influence of the actions of the Katukov brigade, his opinion about the capabilities of the T-34 changed significantly:

“I drew up a report on this situation, which is new for us, and sent it to the Army Group. I described in understandable terms the clear advantage of the T-34 over our Pz.IV and gave the appropriate conclusions that were supposed to affect our future tank building ... "

After the battle for Moscow, the T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army, since 1942 more of them have been produced than all other tanks combined. In 1942, T-34s take the most active part in battles along the entire front line, with the exception of the Leningrad Front and the Kola Peninsula. The role of these tanks in the Battle of Stalingrad was especially significant, due to the proximity to the combat area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, from the shops of which the tanks went directly to the front. It should be noted that from the end of 1941, German troops began to receive new, more effective means of anti-tank warfare, and therefore, during 1942, the T-34 gradually lost its position of relative invulnerability from the standard anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. From the end of 1941, German troops began to receive sub-caliber and cumulative shells in significant quantities; From the beginning of 1942, production of the 37 mm Pak 35/36 cannon was discontinued, and the 50 mm Pak 38 cannon was significantly increased. In the spring of 1942, German troops began to receive powerful 75 mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns; however, their production developed rather slowly. The troops began to receive anti-tank guns created by altering captured guns - Pak 36 (r) and Pak 97/38, as well as, in relatively small numbers, powerful anti-tank guns with a tapered bore - 28/20-mm sPzB 41, 42- mm Pak 41 and 75-mm Pak 41. The armament of German tanks and self-propelled guns was strengthened - they received long-barreled 50-mm and 75-mm guns with high armor penetration. At the same time, there was a gradual increase in the frontal armor of German tanks and assault guns.

1943 was the year of the most mass production and use of T-34 tanks with a 76 mm cannon. The largest battle of this period was the Battle of Kursk, during which the Soviet tank units, which were based on the T-34, together with other types of troops, managed to stop the German offensive, while suffering heavy losses. Modernized German tanks and assault guns, which had frontal armor reinforced to 70-80 mm, became less vulnerable to the T-34 cannon, while their artillery armament made it possible to confidently hit Soviet tanks. The appearance of heavily armed and well-armored heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" added to this rather bleak picture. The question of strengthening the armament and armor of the tank was urgently raised, which led to the creation of the T-34-85 modification.

In 1944, the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon continued to be the main Soviet tank, but from the middle of the year the tank was gradually replaced by the T-34-85. As part of the Soviet tank units, the T-34 took part in major offensive operations that ended in the defeat of a large number of German units and the liberation of significant territories. Despite lagging behind German tanks in armament and armor, the T-34s acted quite successfully - the Soviet military leadership, having created a significant numerical superiority and seizing the strategic initiative, could choose the direction of strikes and, breaking the enemy's defenses, introduce tank units into a breakthrough, conducting large-scale operations to the environment. German tank units, at best, managed to fend off the impending crisis, at worst, they were forced to quickly retreat from the planned "boilers", abandoning faulty equipment or simply remaining without fuel. The Soviet military leadership sought to avoid tank battles as much as possible, leaving anti-tank artillery and aviation to fight German tanks.

The technical reliability of the T-34, significantly increased by the beginning of 1945, allowed the command to carry out a series of quick and deep operations with their participation. At the beginning of 1945, the headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army noted that the T-34s exceeded the warranty service life by 1.5-2 times and had a practical resource of up to 350-400 engine hours.

By the beginning of 1945, the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon was already relatively small in the troops, the niche of the main Soviet tank was firmly occupied by the T-34-85. Nevertheless, the remaining vehicles, in particular in the form of sapper tanks, minesweepers, took an active part in the battles of the final year of the war, including in the Berlin operation. A number of these tanks took part in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

In general, a tank is needed to fight, first of all, with manpower and enemy fortifications, and here a more powerful HE shell is needed. Ammunition (b.c.) T-34 consisted of 100 shots, and 75 of them were with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile. Of course, the tankers themselves, along the way, took into the tank what they needed most. But in any case, not only armor-piercing shells. When the Tiger or Panther reaches the T-34 in 1.5-2 km, and with good optics, and with comfort and a smooth ride, it's great. But the war is not fought on open ranges. The incidents of destruction of our tanks at such a distance were so isolated that they did not even affect the "local battles". More often than not, the tankers still burned each other at close range, but from ambushes. And here other qualities of the tank are more important, for example, maneuverability, which depends on the mass of the tank. Until now, our tanks, the great-grandchildren of the T-34, with all characteristics equal to those of the "Americans" and "Germans", have less weight.

Even the 122 mm cannon of separate-case loading of the IS-2, yielding in rate of fire to the "tiger" one, solved the problem of not only fighting the armored vehicles of the Germans. The IS-2 was called the breakthrough tank. And the same "Tiger" was just tasked with destroying our armored vehicles, better from afar, better from ambushes and always under the cover of their medium tanks. If the army wins, then it needs breakthrough tanks with a predominance in the battlefield. HE shells. If it retreats, then destroyer tanks are needed. At the same time, the Germans focused on "supertanks" of piece production, "Tigers" and "Panthers" stamped only about 7000 units during the entire War. Stalin focused on the mass production of the T-34 and ZIS-3.

Description of construction

Serial modifications:

  • Medium tank T-34/76 mod. 1940 - T-34/76 tanks, produced in 1940, had a combat weight of 26.8 tons and were armed with a 76-mm L-11 cannon of the 1939 model;
  • Medium tank T-34/76 mod. 1941/42 - with the F-32 / F-34 cannon;
  • Medium tank T-34-76 mod. 1942 - with a cast turret;
  • Medium tank T-34-76 mod. 1942/43 - a five-speed gearbox was introduced on the tanks, instead of a four-speed one, a more powerful 9-R radio station was installed instead of 71-TK-3, a commander's cupola appeared, and the tower itself became hexagonal.

A short summary of the number of T-34s produced:

  • For 1940 - 110 pieces;
  • For 1941 - 2996 pieces;
  • For 1942 - 1252 units;
  • For 1943 - 15,821 pieces;
  • For 1944 - 14648 pieces;
  • For 1945 - 12551 pieces;
  • For 1946 - 2707 pieces.

The T-34 has a classic layout. The tank's crew consists of four people - a driver-mechanic and a radio operator-gunner, located in the control compartment and a loader with a commander, who also acts as a gunner, who were located in a two-seat turret.

There were no clearly identified modifications of the linear T-34-76. Nevertheless, there were significant differences in the design of production vehicles, caused by different production conditions at each of the factories that produced them at certain periods of time, as well as by the general improvement of the tank. In the historical literature, these differences are usually grouped by manufacturer and production period, sometimes with an indication of a characteristic feature if two or more types of machines were produced in parallel at the plant. However, in the army, the picture could become even more complicated, since, due to the high maintainability of the T-34, damaged tanks were most often restored again, and the units of damaged vehicles of different versions were often assembled into a whole tank in various combinations.

Armored corps and turret

Armored body T-34 - welded, assembled from rolled plates and sheets of homogeneous steel grade MZ-2 (I8-S), thickness 13, 16, 40 and 45 mm, after assembly subjected to surface hardening. The armor protection of the tank is anti-cannon, equal strength, made with rational angles of inclination. The frontal part consisted of 45 mm thick armor plates converging in a wedge: the top, located at an angle of 60 ° to the vertical, and the bottom, located at an angle of 53 °. Between themselves, the upper and lower frontal armor plates were connected using a beam. The sides of the hull in their lower part were located vertically and had a thickness of 45 mm. The upper part of the sides, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe fenders, consisted of 40-mm armor plates located at an angle of 40 °. The stern part was assembled from two 40-mm armor plates converging in a wedge: the upper, located at an angle of 47 ° and the lower, located at an angle of 45 °. The roof of the tank in the area of \u200b\u200bthe engine-transmission compartment was assembled from 16-mm armor plates, and in the area of \u200b\u200bthe turret platform it had a thickness of 20 mm. The bottom of the tank was 13 mm thick under the engine compartment and 16 mm in the frontal part, and a small section of the aft end of the bottom consisted of 40 mm armor plate. The T-34 tower is a two-seater, close to a hexagonal shape, with a stern niche. Depending on the manufacturing plant and the year of production, turrets of various designs could be installed on the tank. On the T-34 of the first issues, a welded tower of rolled plates and sheets was installed. The walls of the tower were made of 45-mm armor plates, located at an angle of 30 °, the front of the tower was a 45-mm, curved in the form of a half-cylinder, a plate with cutouts for mounting a gun, machine gun and sight. The roof of the tower consisted of a 15-mm armor plate bent at an angle from 0 ° to 6 ° to the horizontal, the bottom of the aft niche was a horizontal 13-mm armor plate. Although other types of towers were also assembled by welding, it is the towers of the original type that are known in the literature as “welded”.

Firepower

The 76.2-mm L-11 and F-34 guns installed on the T-34 provided him in 1940-1941 with a significant superiority in gun power over all serial samples of foreign armored vehicles due to a balanced combination of relatively high action against both armored and unarmored targets. The armor penetration of the F-34 was significantly inferior to the KwK 40, and pretty decently to the American 75-mm M-3 gun, but in 1941-1942 its capabilities were more than enough to defeat German tanks and assault guns, the thickness of which at that time did not exceed 50- 70 mm. So, according to a secret report from NII-48 from 1942, the frontal armor of German tanks confidently penetrated 76.2 mm shells at almost any distance, including within the course angles ± 45 °. Only the middle frontal armor plate 50 mm thick, located at an inclination of 52 ° to the vertical, made its way only from a distance of up to 800 m. During the war, the design of the tank was constantly modernized, in place of it, other newer and more effective guns were installed on the tank.

Security

The level of armor protection of the T-34 provided him in the summer of 1941 with reliable protection against all standard anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. The 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank guns, which made up the vast majority of the Wehrmacht's anti-tank guns, had any chance of penetrating the frontal armor only when they hit weakened places. The sides of the T-34 with 37-mm caliber projectiles were struck only in the vertical lower part and at short distances, and without giving a guaranteed reserve action. Subcaliber shells were more effective, capable of relatively effectively penetrating the lower side and sides of the turret, but their actual firing range did not exceed 300 m, and their armor-piercing effect was low - often the tungsten carbide core crumbled into the sand after piercing the armor without harming the crew ... The 50-mm KwK 38 cannon with a 42-caliber barrel length, which was installed on the PzKpfw III Ausf.F - Ausf.J tanks, was also ineffective against the frontal armor of the T-34. The short-barreled 75-mm KwK 37 cannons installed on the early modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG III were even less effective, and with an armor-piercing projectile, with the exception of hits in weakened zones, they could only hit the lower part of the sides at distances of less than 100 meters. However, the situation was greatly mitigated by the presence of a cumulative projectile in its ammunition load - although the latter worked only at relatively small meeting angles with the armor and was also ineffective against the T-34's frontal protection, but most of the tank was easily hit by it. The first really effective means of dealing with the T-34 was the Pak 40 75-mm anti-tank gun, which had appeared in the troops in any noticeable quantities by the spring of 1942, and the KwK 40 75-mm tank gun with a 43 caliber barrel length, installed on PzKpfw tanks IV and StuG.III assault guns from the summer of that year. The KwK 40 caliber armor-piercing projectile at a course angle of 0 ° hit the frontal armor of the T-34 hull from a distance of 1000 m or less, while the forehead of the turret in the area of \u200b\u200bthe gun mantlet was hit from 1 km or more. At the same time, the high-hardness armor used on the T-34 was prone to chipping on the inside, even when the shell ricocheted. So, long-barreled 75-mm guns formed dangerous fragments when hit at distances up to 2 km, and 88-mm - already up to 3 km. However, during 1942, relatively few long-barreled 75-mm guns were produced, and the bulk of anti-tank weapons available to the Wehrmacht were still 37-mm and 50-mm guns. 50-mm guns at normal combat ranges in the summer of 1942 to disable the T-34 required an average of 5 hits with highly deficient sub-caliber shells.

Calculators